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Note
Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling
the Disabled
Wendy S. Tien
When Robert, a young hearing-impaired engineer, joined
the staff of a computer software firm in August 1989, he signed
as a condition of his employment a contract that required him
to submit all disputes arising from his employment to arbitra-
tion.1 Three years later, after the firm had consistently denied
Robert promotion despite excellent performance reviews, he
sued the firm for employment discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 2
1. Arbitration is the voluntary submission of a dispute, by the parties to
that dispute, to an impartial "judge" whose decision on the merits is final and
binding. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKouRi, How ARBITRA-
TION WoRKs 2-9 (4th ed. 1985) and FAmWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1-22, 513-530 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter FAIRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION] for a thorough introduction to em-
ployment and labor arbitration. Commercial arbitration is the substitution by
agreement of arbitration for judicial resolution of business disputes. ELKOURI
& ELKOURI, supra at 3.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. III 1991). Because the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") only
took effect in July 1992, this example of an employment discrimination claim
is purely hypothetical. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990). Exhaustive studies of disabled in-
dividuals in the United States reveal that disabled Americans as a group "are
much poorer, have far less education, have less social and community life, par-
ticipate much less often in social activities that other Americans regularly en-
joy, and express less satisfaction with life." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447. Nowhere is
the disparity between disabled America and mainstream America more pro-
nounced than in the employment area:
Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemploy-
ment and poverty. According to a recent Louis Harris poll "not work-
ing" is perhaps the truest definition of what it means to be disabled in
America. Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16
and 64 are [not] working at all; yet, a large majority of those not
working say that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age
disabled persons, who are not working, say that they would like to
have a job.... Translated into absolute terms, this means that about
8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find a job.
1443
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the district court, the firm moved to compel dispute ar-
bitration under section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA").3 The firm argued that Robert voluntarily agreed to
submit all disputes resulting from his employment to arbitra-
tion.4 Robert contested the "voluntariness" of this agreement
and further argued that public policy and section 1 of the FAA5
precluded enforcement of the clause that stripped him of his
statutory rights under the ADA.6
In the ADA, Congress provides that:
[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotia-
tions, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this
chapter.7
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the arbi-
tration of employment discrimination claims is "authorized by
law" under the FAA.8 Further, arbitration of ADA claims may
not be "appropriate" if the policies behind the ADA are incon-
sistent with compulsory binding arbitration.9
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 (citing Louis HARms & ASSOCIATES, THE ICD [INTERNA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR THE DISABLED] SURvEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRING-
ING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 47-50 (1986)).
Discrimination, noted the Committee on Education and Labor, reveals itself in
many ways: standards and criteria that effectively deny job opportunities to
disabled individuals; stereotypes, presumptions and myths about job perform-
ance; dead-end job placement; failure to provide equal promotion opportuni-
ties; and pre-employment screening for disabilities not relevant to job
performance. Id. at 33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 315 (citation omit-
ted). Because 43 million Americans are disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, discrimination on the basis of disabilities has a detrimental effect on a
large number of Americans. See BONNIE R. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
LAW § 20:2 (1992) (citation omitted).
3. Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988)).
4. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (regarding enforcement of agreement to submit
"a controversy" arising out of an arbitration contract).
5. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); see infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the FAA).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. III 1991).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. III 1991).
8. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991), the
most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the substantive arbitrability of
statutory claims, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether § 1 of
the FAA excludes all employment contracts. Id. at 1651-52 n.2.
9. For this substantive arbitrability test, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), discussed infra notes 57-64
and accompanying text.
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This Note examines the arbitration provision of the ADA
in the context of the FAA, legislative history, and public policy.
Part I discusses the FAA and the ADA, together with key cases
that have treated the intersection of statutory claims and arbi-
tration. Part II examines the policy objectives of the ADA and
current attitudes toward arbitration, and argues that compul-
sory arbitration of ADA claims is inconsistent with both the
general "employment contracts" exception to the FAA and cen-
tral ADA policies. Part III concludes that although courts may
not compel binding arbitration of ADA claims under either a
collective bargaining agreement or an employment contract,
the parties may agree to arbitration as part of the voluntary
settlement of an ADA claim.
I. ARBITRATION AND THE ADA: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A. TITLE I OF THE ADA
Congress enacted the ADA with some of the following pur-
poses in mind:
to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; ... to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities; ... [and] to ensure
that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in [the ADA] on behalf of individuals with
disabilities.1
0
Persistent discrimination against disabled individuals in hous-
ing, employment, and education provided the impetus for this
legislation."'
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(3) (Supp. III 1991). By protecting individual
rights, the ADA aims to further important social goals of equality and social
awareness-i.e., that the ADA creates public rights. See generally Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1985) (describing the na-
ture of public rights and noting that public rights have been construed in the
past to include those disputes arising out of the federal government's adminis-
tration of its laws and programs); Nicholas W. Lobenthal, Comment, The Arbi-
trability of ADEA Claims: Toward an Epistemology of Congressional Silence,
23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 78-91 (1989) (identifying public rights as
rights that advance public interests and not merely private ones, and proposing
that when a statute embodies certain public rights, judicial resolution is pref-
erable to arbitration).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. III 1991). In particular, Congress noted
that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion . . . [or] relegation to
lesser.., benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
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Title I of the ADA'2 sets forth its employment provisions
and generally prohibits an employer' 3 from discriminating
against a disabled employee who can perform the "essential
functions" of her job,14 with reasonable accommodations if re-
quired,15 on the basis of her disability.16 Perhaps the most sali-
ent feature of Title I, however, is its incorporation of the
remedies from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Title
I allows the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), the Attorney General, or "any person alleging dis-
crimination" in violation of Title I or subsequent regulations to
invoke the powers, remedies, and procedures of Title VII.'8
The original text of the ADA did not discuss arbitration.
During debate, however, the House Committee on the Judici-
ary introduced section 513 to "encourage alternative means of
dispute resolution that are already authorized by law."' 9 The
Committee stressed, however, that it intended only to supple-
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. III 1991).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991). This provision parallels the
definition of "employer" in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1991).
15. The ADA defines "reasonable accommodation" to include improving
the physical accessibility of the workplace, job restructuring, and other forms
of facilitation such as supplying training materials or providing readers or in-
terpreters. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. III).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991). Discrimination on the basis of
disability includes, among other things, attempts to classify disabled individu-
als in a way that affects their status or opportunity, failing to make reasonable
accommodations absent a showing of undue hardship, or using tests and other
standards that tend to screen out disabled individuals without providing an ad-
equate defense. Id. § 12112(b). The employer may defend a charge that its
hiring and promotion practices tend to screen out disabled individuals by dem-
onstrating both that the disability is job-related and inconsistent with business
necessity and that reasonable accommodation by the employer would not solve
this problem. Id. § 12113(a).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. II 1991). The powers, remedies, and proce-
dures of Title VII are located in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8
and 2000e-9 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Some commentators believe that this sort
of statutory remedial scheme exercises beneficial deterrent effects on subse-
quent illegal discrimination. See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Sie-
gelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991) (empirical data on effects of employment discrimina-
tion laws on deterrence and victim willingness to bring suits).
19. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499. The arbitration provision the Judiciary Committee intro-
duced is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. III 1991).
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ment remedies the ADA made available, not to replace them.20
It observed that any agreement to arbitrate disputes arising
under either a collective bargaining agreement or an employ-
ment contract would not foreclose an employee's statutory rem-
edies but would instead provide a purely voluntary alternative
mechanism for resolving disputes.2' The Senate agreed to the
House amendment in joint conference.22
B. THE FAA
In 1925, Congress passed laws governing compulsory bind-
ing arbitration of commercial disputes and set forth uniform
federal standards of dispute resolution.2 Section 2, later codi-
fied as the FAA,24 stated:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
20. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499. The Judiciary Committee also refused to preempt rele-
vant state laws. Id. at 70, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493. The Commit-
tee further state&
Under Section 501(b) of the ADA, all of the rights, remedies and pro-
cedures that are available to people with disabilities under other fed-
eral laws, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or other
state laws (including state common law) are not preempted by this
Act. This approach is consistent with that taken in other civil rights
laws. The basic principle underlying this provision is that Congress
does not intend to displace any of the rights or remedies provided by
other federal or laws [sic] or other state laws (including state common
law) which provide greater or equal protection to individuals with
disabilities.
I& (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 76-77, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499-500. To support this
proposition, the Committee cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974), a Title VII arbitration case in which the Court held that the right to
a judicial forum under Title VII cannot be prospectively waived. H.R. REP.
No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 77, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 500. The
Committee further noted that because Title I of the ADA incorporates Title
VII by reference, Gardner-Denver directly applies. Id.
22. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 595, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598. Congressman Glickman, who introduced § 513,
stressed the voluntary nature of alternative dispute resolution under the
ADA. 136 CONG. REc. H2421, H2431 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) [hereinafter
HOUSE RECORD]). Section 513, he noted, provided only a "reminder" that ag-
grieved parties could vindicate their rights while avoiding litigation through
voluntary arbitration. Id.
23. Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (1988)).
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
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such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.2 5
Section 1 of the FAA, provides an exception to section 2,
however, noting that although
"commerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States
or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and any
State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any
State or Territory or foreign nation ... nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.
2 6
The meaning of this exception to the FAA remains un-
resolved27 because the Supreme Court has not defined the
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (emphasis added).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (emphasis added).
27. In United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., the
Supreme Court resolved an early source of intercircuit conflict-whether
"contracts of employment" under § 1 includes collective bargaining agree-
ments. The Court, in the context of a collective bargaining dispute, observed
that the FAA "does not apply to 'contracts of employment of... workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce."' 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (citations
omitted).
Based on Misco, the Sixth Circuit concluded that § l's exclusion extends
to labor contracts. Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404
(6th Cir. 1988). Other circuits had accepted this conclusion even prior to
Misco. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv.,
823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987) (observing that "the position that collective
bargaining agreements are not 'contracts of employment' within the meaning
of the exclusionary language of the [FAA] ... cannot be cited with any confi-
dence as the current view of any of the federal courts of appeals").
Since Misco, however, the circuit courts have encountered the more diffi-
cult problem of whether "contracts of employment" includes employment pro-
visions within a larger commercial contract. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., discussed infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text, the Court, de-
ferring to lower court opinions, held that the part of a commercial agreement
that concerned the arbitration of employment disputes was not a "contract of
employment" under the FAA. 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651-52 n.2 (1991). Justice Ste-
vens disagreed with this interpretation, criticizing the majority for imposing
too narrow a construction on "employment contracts." Justice Stevens noted
that although both parties conceded that they entered into no "employment
contract" per se, Interstate had required Gilmer to become a registered repre-
sentative of securities exchanges as a condition of employment and thus had,
in Justice Stevens's eyes, an employment contract with Gilmer. Id. at 1659
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Jennifer R. Dowd, Enforcing Arbitration
Agreements in Age Discrimination Suits: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 33 B. C. L. REV. 435, 445 (1992) (noting that "[i]f employees like Gilmer
can now inadvertently and unwittingly waive their rights to bring charges of
employment discrimination by signing indirect contracts made with non-em-
ployers, then Gilmer raises cause for even greater concern.").
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scope of "interstate commerce" in this context 2s and because
the legislative history is, as one court lamented, "at best ...
vague and inconclusive." 29  The courts of appeals uniformly
construe "commerce," as generally used in the FAA, as "coex-
tensive with congressional power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause"30 but remain divided over whether this broad
28. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647
(1991); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
29. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). A committee
of the American Bar Association ("ABA") drafted the FAA in response to
ABA instructions to consider and report upon "the further extension of the
principle of commercial arbitration." AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, 45 REPORT OF THE
FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 75 (1920).
Because of this, Congress devoted virtually all of the legislative history to com-
mercial arbitration. Only three times does the history address labor or em-
ployment arbitration. Mr. Furuseth of the Seamen's Union originally
proposed an amendment to the bill that would exclude "seamen" and "any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from arbi-
tration under the FAA, for fear that maritime employers could subvert admi-
ralty law by forcing stevedores to arbitrate their labor disputes. AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, 48 REPORT OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCATION 287 (1923) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. W.H.H. Piatt, the
chairman of the ABA committee responsible for drafting the FAA, responded
to Furuseth's concern:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitration
in any sense; and so I suggest that in as far as the committee is con-
cerned, if your honorable committee should feel that there is any dan-
ger of that, they should add to the bill the following language, "but
nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class of work-
ers in interstate and foreign commerce." It is not intended that this
shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.
Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcom. of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) [hereinafter
FAA Hearings]. Senator Walsh remarked on the problem of compulsory la-
bor arbitration:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts
that are not entered into are not really voluntarily [sic] things at all.
Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or
you can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either
you can make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is
the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says
"These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders
his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried
before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Id. (statement of Sen. Walsh). Congress enacted this exception to the FAA
without apparent further comment.
30. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986); accord, Mesa Operat-
ing Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 243-44
(5th Cir. 1986). The Commerce Clause invests Congress with the power "[t]o
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construction extends to the exception 3' and disagree over
whether the exception requires employees to be actively en-
gaged in interstate transportation.32
In Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers,33 the Third Circuit adopted a narrow defini-
tion of "commerce" for purposes of the section 1 exclusion,
even though it construed "commerce" broadly in defining the
scope of the FAA's general coverage under section 2.3 4 The
court stated:
We think that the intent of [including workers in interstate com-
merce] was, under the rule of ejusdem generis, to include only those
other classes of workers who are likewise engaged directly in com-
merce, that is, only those other classes of workers who are actually
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in
work so closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.35
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. The only thorough discussions of the exclusion have come from the
Court's dissenters. In Gilmer, Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's re-
fusal to consider whether § 1 of the FAA excluded all employment contracts,
noting that the majority "skirts the antecedent question of whether the cover-
age of the [FAA] even extends to arbitration clauses contained in employment
contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at issue." 111 S. Ct. at
1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court maintained that the lower courts did
not entertain the issue, that Gilmer did not raise the issue in his petition for
certiorari and, moreover, that the clause was not part of an employment con-
tract per se but was instead an employment clause in a general contract with
securities exchanges, not with his employer. Id. at 1651-2 n.2; accord, Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404
(6th Cir. 1988).
33. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc).
34. Id. at 453.
35. Id. at 452. The court examined the legislative history of the FAA, con-
cluding that the drafters of the Act added the "workers engaged in... inter-
state commerce" phrase to appease the Seamen's Union, which argued that
because admiralty law had jurisdiction over seamen's wages, maritime workers
should not be subjected to arbitration agreements. Id. The court also identi-
fied congressional intent to exclude railway workers, whose disputes the Rail-
way Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), controlled. Id. at 452 (quoting
ABA REPORT, supra note 29, at 287). But see Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbi-
tration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591, 597-99 (1954) (remarking
that the Tenney Engineering court's approach to defining "interstate com-
merce," "is clearly wrong").
Judge McLaughlin, joined by Judge Staley, delved further into the legisla-
tive history, and determined that "there can be no compulsory arbitration
under this Act of collective bargaining agreements." Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at
455-56 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) (citing FAA Hearings, supra note 29, at 9;
65 CONG. REc. 984, 1931, 11,080 (1924)) (emphasis added). Judge McLaughlin
contended that "[s]ince the intention of Congress manifestly was to confine
[Vol. 77:14431450
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Three other circuits have adopted the Tenney Engineering re-
striction, endorsing its narrow definition of "commerce" for
purposes of the section 1 exception.3
6
Several other circuits favor a broader definition of "com-
merce" that includes nearly all workers employed in an indus-
try that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause.
3 7
For example, in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.38 the
Sixth Circuit argued that Congress intended to extend both the
FAA "and its exclusions" to the extent of its Commerce Clause
powers.39 The Willis court reasoned that a broad definition of
"commerce" extends not only to the general language of section
2 but also to the exclusionary language of section 1.40 Imposing
the Act to commercial disputes, ejusdem generis has no possible relevancy
here," and inferred that the majority's application of this principle was "in
conflict with the general purpose of the statute." Id. at 458 (McLaughlin, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Adhering to the antiquated definition of "in-
terstate commerce" in 1925, he noted, distorts the scope of the exception for
three reasons. First, Congress certainly possessed the power in 1925 (presuma-
bly under the Commerce Clause) to exclude all employment contracts from
the FAA's provisions, not merely those in the direct channels of interstate
commerce. Id Second, even if Congress defined power under the Commerce
Clause more narrowly in 1925 than in 1953, the narrow definition should not
bind the court because "the law is not so inflexible." Id. at 459. Finally, the
reenactment and codification of the Act as the FAA in 1947 suggests that the
broader view of "commerce" in 1947 should apply. Id-
36. For example, the First Circuit held that a brokerage account executive
does not engage in "interstate commerce" because other courts have limited
§ l's exception to employees "involved in, or closely related to the actual
movement of goods in interstate commerce." Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d
783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (citing, e.g., Tenney Engg, 207 F.2d at 452-53). Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit held that the exception does not cover a professional
basketball player despite his obvious interstate movement. Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Erving clearly is
not involved in the transportation industry"); see also Miller Brewing Co. v.
Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (limit-
ing § l's exclusion, without elaboration, to workers employed in transportation
industries), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
37. Other circuits have not attempted to define the scope of the exception.
See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 n.* (5th Cir.
1991) (admonishing courts to "be mindful of this potential [FAA] issue in fu-
ture cases" but not addressing it); American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1987) (opting not to
"choose sides" in the FAA debate); Local 1020, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
FMC Corp., 658 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting a preference for excluding all labor disputes from the FAA but recog-
nizing the Court's reluctance to decide the issue)).
38. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
39. Id. at 310 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1984)
(emphasis added)).
40. Id. at 310-11 (citations omitted).
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a narrower meaning on section l's exclusions than on section
2's inclusions, it stated, "would be inconsistent. '41
The court paid particular attention to the role of the civil
rights movement in defining the scope of the FAA, reasoning
that in cases arising under civil rights statutes, the scope of the
section 1 exception should be coextensive with the scope of the
Commerce Clause.4 Because Title VII or Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims require employer in-
volvement in interstate commerce,43 the court reasoned, em-
ployment contracts with such employers constitute "contracts
of employment ... [in] interstate commerce" excluded by sec-
tion 1 of the FAA.44
41. Id at 311 (quoting United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Miller
Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954)). Archibald Cox criticized
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Tenney Engineering v. United Electrical, Ra-
dio & Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953), as inconsistent and "self-
defeating." See Cox, supra note 35, at 599. Section 2 of the FAA would only
apply to a collective bargaining grievance at all, he observed, if the collective
bargaining agreement evidences a "'transaction involving commerce."' Id at
598 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). If a § 2 plaintiff wishes to avoid the conclu-
sion that the collective bargaining agreement falls within the § 1 exception,
however, she must argue that the employee is not "involved" in commerce.
Cox stated that "[this argument] demonstrates that the contract is that of a
worker engaged in interstate commerce within the exception which prevents
its enforcement," and concluded that the only way to avoid this logical conun-
drum would involve a narrow and technical meaning of the term "commerce."
I&c at 599. "One should not rely on one policy in interpreting the phrases re-
lating to commerce and an opposite conception in reading 'contract of employ-
ment,'" he admonished. Id (footnote omitted).
42. Willis, 948 F.2d at 311. Congress premised the reach of federal an-
tidiscrimination laws, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the Com-
merce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964). Two important cases in 1964 defined
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The first, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
involved a challenge by a Georgia hotel operator to the constitutionality of Ti-
tle II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6. See 379 U.S. at
242-43. The second, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), involved a
challenge to the same statute by a restaurant with an almost wholly intrastate
clientele. 379 U.S. at 296. In both cases, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of Title II based on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; McClung, 379 U.S. at 301, 304. The state ac-
tion problem under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments seems to pro-
vide the original impetus for expanding Commerce Clause powers. Cf. Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260 (noting the prior failure of due process and
equal protection objections). Because Congress has power to reach private
actors under the Commerce Clause, the Court viewed it as an ideal vehicle for
reaching racial discrimination in private business concerns.
43. Willis, 948 F.2d at 311. The court supported this conclusion through
an examination of the legislative history of the FAA. Id.
44. Id. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits reached the same result through a
more cursory analysis. See United Food & Commercial Workers v. Safeway
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C. ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS: THE PRECEDENTS
Even when the FAA does not authorize compulsory arbi-
tration, a party may attempt to compel arbitration pursuant to
the Labor-Management Relations Act 45 or under general con-
tract principles. If the dispute arises under statute, the ques-
tion becomes the substantive arbitrability of the dispute-that
is, whether a statutory remedy for an action that also breaches
a contract, and the injured individual's interest in enforcing
such a statutory remedy, render arbitration inappropriate.
1. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,46 the Supreme Court
held that an employer could not prevent an employee subject to
a collective bargaining agreement that required compulsory ar-
bitration of discrimination claims from bringing a Title VII law-
suit in federal court.4 7 The Court first noted that because
Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1989) (FAA generally inapplicable
to labor arbitration despite lack of showing that union members were involved
in interstate commerce); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal
Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (refusing to adopt the Tenney En-
gineering distinction between employees engaged in the production of goods
for interstate commerce and employees engaged in transportation in interstate
commerce because it found no reasons to impose such a narrow construction
on the statutory language); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) (holding that § 1 specifically excludes
labor contracts from the FAA); International Union v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1948) ("[ilt is perfectly clear, we think,
that it was the intention of Congress to exclude contracts of employment from
the operation of [sections 2, 3 and 4 of the FAA]. Congress was steering clear
of labor disputes.").
45. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)). Section 301 of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act provides the basis for compulsory labor
arbitration.
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
47. Id. at 59-60. The last step of the bargaining agreement's grievance-ar-
bitration procedure stressed that "the arbitrator's decision must be based
solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement." Id. at 40-41
n.3. Alexander testified at his arbitration hearing that he was discharged as a
result of racial discrimination and that he had filed a complaint with the Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission (which referred the complaint to the EEOC) be-
cause he "could not rely on the union" to support his discrimination charge.
Id. at 42.
Following arbitration, the EEOC issued Alexander a "right-to-sue" notice,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1992), and he brought suit
in federal district court. 415 U.S. at 43. The district court granted Gardner-
Denver's motion for summary judgment, holding the arbitration final and
binding as Alexander had "voluntarily elected" to pursue arbitration. Id (cit-
ing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971)). The
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Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate employment discrimi-
nation based on suspect classifications4 8 and because Title VII
vests final enforcement powers solely in federal courts, not in
the EEOC or the various state agencies empowered to settle
disputes through "conference, conciliation, and persuasion,"49
the judicial system remains ultimately responsible for enforcing
Title VII rights.50
Second, the Court rejected the argument that an employee
waives his Title VII cause of action by submitting his grievance
to arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement, it noted, is
a majoritarian instrument that does not necessarily represent
the interests of minority groups and is thus inconsistent with
Title VII, which "concerns not majoritarian processes, but an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities. '51 Had
Alexander and Gardner-Denver knowingly and voluntarily en-
tered into a "settlement expressly conditioned on a waiver of
[his] cause of action under Title VII," the Court commented,
the waiver of rights in exchange for employer concessions
might be appropriate. 52
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal in Gardner-Denver Co. v.
Alexander, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
48. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 44 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971)).
49. Id. The Court concluded that Title VII provisions "make plain that
federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII." Id at 45. "Legislative enactments in [the civil rights] area have
long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination." Id. at 47. The Court also observed that Congress de-
feated amendments in 1964 and 1971 that would have made Title VII the ex-
clusive federal remedy for all unlawful employment practices. Id at 48 n.9
(citing 110 CONG. REC. 13,650-52 (1964) and H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1971)). The Court concluded that the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and its progeny strongly suggest that Title VII, not arbitra-
tion or other statutory remedies, is the final source of relief from discrimina-
tion. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 45 ("Ihe private right of action remains an essential means of
obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII."). Conversely, the Court observed,
the existence of a statutory right against discrimination does not displace an
employee's contractual right to submit a grievance to arbitration because of
"[t]he distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights." Id.
at 50. An arbitrator must interpret and apply only the language of the con-
tract to the grievance while a judge, on the other hand, interprets the laws.
Thus, by instituting a Title VII action in federal court completely distinct from
arbitration, the employee asserts a "statutory right independent of the arbitra-
tion process." Id. at 54.
51. Id. at 51.
52. See id. at 52 & n.15. The Court warned that because Title VII rights
are individual rights of paramount societal importance whose "strictures are
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Finally, the Court held that arbitrators lack authority to
base their decisions on external law.53 Because of this, the
Court rejected the theory that federal courts should defer to ar-
bitral decisions on statutory issues.54 The Court expressed its
concern over the inevitable deprivation of statutory rights that
would result from deferral to the arbitral process,5 5 observing
absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices," prospective waiver of an employee's Title VII
rights through collective bargaining defeats the "paramount congressional pur-
pose behind Title VII." Id.; see also William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
ADVOCATES, supra, at 336, 339 (recognizing that "inasmuch as majority rule
simply has not worked in a sufficiently satisfactory manner, Congress had to
prohibit by law discrimination because of race, sex, religion, and national ori-
gin"); Robert G. Howlett, Why Arbitrators Apply External Law, in LABOR AR-
BITRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 257, 268 & n.48 (Max Zimny
et al. eds., 1990) (agreeing with Justice Brennan's statement in Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981), that "[t]he union's interests
and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compati-
ble"). See generally Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Arbitrating
Discrimination Grievances in the Wake of Gardner-Denver, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Oct. 1983, at 3, 5 (empirical study illustrating the importance of judicial
resolution as a countermajoritarian remedy, in part through a finding that
71.9% labor attorneys favored the Gardner-Denver decision even though only
28.2% of management attorneys did).
53. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53. The Court pointed out that because
the source of the arbitrator's authority is the bargaining agreement, the arbi-
trator must base her decision upon the contract language and the intent of the
parties. Id.
54. Id. at 55-56. Gardner-Denver asserted three bases for judicial defer-
ence to arbitral decisions: first, when the parties presented the statutory claim
to the arbitrator; second, when the bargaining agreement prohibited the dis-
crimination charged in the Title VII suit; and third, "when the arbitrator has
the authority to rule on the claim" and to provide a remedy. Id.
55. Id. at 55-59. The "deferral rule," noted the Court, "is necessarily pre-
mised on the assumption that arbitral processes are commensurate with judi-
cial processes and that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to
arbitral decisions on Title VII issues." Id at 56. The Court thought this as-
sumption "unlikely." Id. Arbitration of statutorily protected employment
rights, the Court explained, falls short of the judicial process in several ways.
First, arbitrators are specially competent in "the law of the shop, not the law
of the land." Id. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)). Because of this, arbitrators are ill-suited
to resolve statutory or constitutional questions. Second, the factfinding pro-
cess in arbitration is not the same as judicial factfinding-for example, because
the rules of evidence do not apply, the usual precautions of discovery, cross-
examination and testimony under oath, inter alia, are limited or unavailable.
Id. at 57-58 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953)). Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, "'arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award,"' making arbitration a casual and inexpensive process that, while an
expeditious means of disposing of many disputes, is inappropriate for resolving
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that employees might consequently avoid voluntary arbitration
and paradoxically generate more litigation.56
2. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Ten years later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,5 7 the Court found that Gardner-Den-
ver's reasoning did not apply to commercial disputes.58 In Mit-
subishi, the Court compelled the arbitration of an antitrust
claim under an international sales agreement based on the
trend toward compulsory arbitration of statutory disputes.5 9
Nonetheless, it observed that either express congressional in-
tent to preclude waiver of an employee's statutory right to a ju-
dicial proceeding,60 or a fundamental inconsistency between
statutory goals and arbitration would render arbitration of a
statutory dispute inappropriate.61 Applying this two-part test
for substantive arbitrability of statutory claims to the Sherman
Act, the Court concluded that the statutory language, its legis-
lative history, and the purposes underlying the Sherman Act
the important public policy concerns behind Title VII's statutory mandate. Id.
at 58 & n.19 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960)); cf. HOwARD R. SACKS & LEwIS S. KURLANTzICK,
MISSING WITNESSES, MISSING TESTIMONY, & MISSING THEORIES: HOW MUCH
INITIATvE By LABOR ARBITRATORS? 123-24 (1988) (opining that when the par-
ties to arbitration cannot agree on whether the arbitrator should be allowed to
decide questions of "external law" for which the contract does not explicitly
provide, the arbitrator should decline to decide the questions and preserve for
the complaining party its "veto over [arbitral] initiative").
56. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59.
57. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
58. Id at 625. The Mitsubishi dispute arose under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1988). Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 619.
59. The Mitsubishi Court reasoned that "we are well past the time when
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of ar-
bitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative
means of dispute resolution." Id. at 626-27.
60. I& at 627-28 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S 427, 434-35 (1953)).
61. Id. at 632-37. The Mitsubishi Court explained that "the Court of Ap-
peals correctly conducted a two-step inquiry, first determining whether the
parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then, upon
finding that it did, considering whether legal constraints external to the par-
ties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims." Id. at 628. Later
decisions further develop the Mitsubishi two-part test. See Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (stating Mit-
subishi's two-part test for substantive arbitrability of statutory claims: "If
Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a partic-
ular claim, such an intent 'will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legisla-
tive history' or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's
underlying purposes." (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-37 (internal citation
omitted)).
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did not render antitrust claims substantively nonarbitrable. 62
Despite Mitsubishi's recognition that not all statutory
claims are substantively arbitrable, courts began applying Mit-
subishi and other commercial arbitration cases6 3 to narrow
Gardner-Denver's application to employment discrimination
cases. This progressive narrowing culminated in the Supreme
Court's 1991 employment discrimination decision, Gilmer v. In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp.6
3. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,65 the latest
Supreme Court case to consider compulsory arbitration, the
Court addressed whether an employer can compel arbitration
of an ADEA claim.66 At the outset, the Court emphasized that
it expressed no opinion about the scope of the exception in sec-
tion I of the FAA.6 7 Instead, it applied the FAA, distinguishing
the arbitration clause in Gilmer as part of a commercial con-
tract, not part of a collective bargaining agreement.68 The
Court then turned to Mitsubishi's two-part test.69 It found no
evidence that Congress intended such preclusion of arbitration
62. 473 U.S. at 629-36 (citations omitted).
63. E.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (upholding enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate commercial
claims under several sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (same).
64. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
65. 1&
66. I& at 1650. The plaintiff in Gilmer was a 62 year-old securities repre-
sentative who claimed that he lost his job as a result of age discrimination. Id
at 1651. His registration with various stock exchanges, as required for employ-
ment, provided that he would agree to arbitrate any disputes-in particular,
any controversy arising out of his employment or termination-between him-
self and his employer. Id at 1650-51.
Gilmer brought an ADEA suit in federal court after his termination. His
employer responded with a motion to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim
pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the registration and the FAA. Id& at
1651. The district court denied the motion by extending Gardner-Denver's
reasoning to ADEA claimants. Id. In reversing the lower court's decision, the
Fourth Circuit found "'nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying
purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.'" Id (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990)).
67. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2.
68. Id.; see supra notes 27 & 31 for Justice Stevens' dissent, urging the
Court to address the scope of the § 1 exception and to more carefully consider
whether labor and employment disputes are ever arbitrable under the FAA.
69. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
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either through the text or legislative history of the ADEA. 70
Likewise, it found no inconsistency between compulsory arbi-
tration and the goals of the ADEA, unlike Title VII in Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co.71 Ultimately finding that Gilmer
had not met his burden,72 the Court held that the ADEA does
not preclude enforcement of the arbitration clause under the
FAA.73
70. Id. Gilmer conceded that neither the text or legislative history of the
ADEA explicitly precludes arbitration. Id.
71. Id. at 1653-54. The Court, distinguishing Gardner-Denver, explained
that Gardner-Denver concerned "the issue whether arbitration of contract-
based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims,"
where Gilmer concerned arbitration of statutory claims embodied in a con-
tract. Id at 1657. Further, it observed that Gardner-Denver addressed the
question of whether a collective-bargaining agreement provided adequate pro-
tection to individual rights, a tension not present in Gilmer, where the em-
ployee had signed an individual employment contract. Id. See Thomas H.
Stewart, Comment, Arbitrating Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1415, 1436-37 (1991) (asserting that courts should bind employees to arbi-
tration agreements and accepting idea that because unions are "one of the
traditional sources of discrimination," individual employment agreements do
not present the problem the Court addressed in Gardner-Denver). Contra
Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
"an employee cannot waive prospectively her right to a judicial forum at any
time, regardless of the type of employment agreement which she signs"), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990); see also Dowd, supra note 27, at 445 (stating that
"it is clearly against the congressional objectives of the [ADEA] to permit an
employer practicing age discrimination to contract away an elderly employee's
right to waive arbitration"); Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 104 HARv. L. REv. 568, 575 (1990)
(agreeing that allowing an employee to contract away the right to a judicial
resolution under the ADEA might "undermine the ADEA's function of pro-
tecting employees from abuse arising from the disparity in bargaining power
in the employment relationship") (citing Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d
221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Gilmer devoted considerable discussion to the ability of commercial arbi-
tration to mimic a judicial forum. See 111 S. Ct. at 1652-57. Rejecting the
Gardner-Denver arguments that arbitration lacked the qualities of federal
courts that are essential to resolving serious questions of statutory law, the
Court argued that the competence of arbitrators had improved to the point
that the "'mistrust of the arbitral process'" expressed in Gardner-Denver was
no longer wholly valid. Id. at 1656 n.5 (quoting Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987)); cf. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877
F.2d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We do not base our conclusion [denying arbitra-
tion on policy grounds in ADEA cases] on any disparagement of the compe-
tence or sophistication of modern arbitrators.").
72. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652 (citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) for the proposition that the party wishing
to avoid contractual arbitration bears the burden of demonstrating congres-
sional intent).
73. Id. at 1657.
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Several courts have extended Gilmer's holding to compel
arbitration of Title VII claims under commercial contracts. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit74 compelled arbitration of a
plaintiff's Title VII claim who signed the same securities agree-
ment as the plaintiff in Gilmer.75 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit 76
relied on Gilmer to reject Gardner-Denver's applicability to
commercial contracts.77
Other circuits, however, maintain the pre-Gilmer position
that Title VII disputes are not substantively arbitrable. For ex-
ample, in Swenson v. Management Recruiters International,78
an employment contract case, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
although Gardner-Denver involved a collective bargaining
agreement and not an employment contract, its reasoning ap-
plies to employment contracts because of the "unique nature"
of Title VII, not the type of contact involved.79 The court re-
jected arguments that the federal policy favoring arbitration
should control, noting that in Title VII cases, Gardner-Denver's
reasoning strongly suggests that Congress did not intend other-
wise valid arbitration clauses to preempt federal judicial reme-
dies.8 0  The court recognized that Mitsubishi8 l concerned
commercial arbitration in the antitrust context, not civil rights
74. Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992).
75. Id, at 700. The court distinguished Gardner-Denver as a collective bar-
gaining case; in Bender, the plaintiff's "statutory rights were not compromised
to secure the interests of other employees in a bargaining unit" as they were
in Gardner-Denver. Id. It also found "no reason to distinguish between
ADEA claims and Title VII claims." Id.
76. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 935. The court then concluded that no substantive policy differ-
ences between the ADEA and Title VII sufficiently distinguished Gardner-
Denver from Gilmer in the arbitral context. The Ninth Circuit felt that "both
statutes are similar in their aims and substantive provisions." Id
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also found Title VII disputes arbitrable
under Gilmer. In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1991), the Sixth Circuit, despite concluding that the interstate commerce ex-
ception in § 1 of the FAA extends to all workers covered by Title VII, none-
theless decided that the type of contract containing the arbitration clause, not
the substantive law in question, governed the arbitrability of the dispute. Id.
at 311-12; see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 975 F.2d. 1161
(5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit directly applied Gilmer in holding that Gard-
ner-Denver's reasoning did not control this Title VII case which, incidentally,
involved the same securities registration as that in Gilmer. Id. at 230 (quoting
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1990)).
78. 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989).
79. Id. at 1306.
80. Id,
81. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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in the employment setting.8 2 Further, it explained that Mitsub-
ishi pronounced congressional intent a better test of arbi-
trability than the adequacy of the forum, 3 and concluded that
when Congress passed Title VII, it found arbitration ill-suited
to realize the "transcendent public interest" in enforcing Title
VII.84
II. ARBITRATION OF ADA CLAIMS
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,85 the Court concluded
that an employee's arbitration of his discrimination claim pur-
suant to a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude him
from later bringing a Title VII claim in federal court.8 6 In Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,87 however, the Court
held that Gardner-Denver does not control the substantive arbi-
trability of an ADEA claim involving a commercial agree-
ment.88 At first glance, Gilmer appears to seriously impair
Gardner-Denver's applicability to ADA disputes. Gilmer in-
volved an employment dispute and a federal antidiscrimination
82. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 & n.5.
83. Id. at 1307; see supra text accompanying note 60.
84. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307. The First Circuit also has not altered its
holding that compulsory arbitration of Title VII cases is inappropriate. Utley
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1045
(1990). For Title VII claims, the Utley Court explained,
[t]he fact that [claimant] signed an individual employment agreement
... is not significant.... [because] a requirement for employees to
participate in arbitration prior to initiating claims in a judicial forum
is inconsistent with the Congressional intent behind Title VII. As
Congress has made the policy against discrimination "a highest prior-
ity," we rule that an employee cannot waive prospectively her right to
a judicial forum at any time, regardless of the type of employment
agreement which she signs.
Id. at 187 (citation omitted). The First Circuit relied upon "Title VII's unique
nature" and policy against discrimination in concluding that prospective
waiver of the right to a judicial forum under Title VII is always invalid. Id at
187; see also Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that Gardner-Denver's reasoning fully applied to ADEA cases).
Other circuits have followed the Swenson rule in the context of other stat-
utes. See, e.g., Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992)
(42 U.S.C. § 1983); EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs.,
957 F.2d 424, 431 n.11 (7th Cir.) (ADEA) (Gilmer "expressly distinguished
cases occurring 'in the context of collective bargaining agreements' "), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d
807 (3d Cir. 1991) (42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2281 (1992); John-
son v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1991) (Title VII).
85. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
86. Id at 51-52.
87. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
88. Id. at 1656-57.
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statute, as did Gardner-Denver. Gilmer's employer sought to
compel arbitration, as did Alexander's employer in Gardner-
Denver. Moreover, Gilmer and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.8 9 seem to signify that the pre-
sumption of arbitrability, at least in the commercial context, is
strong indeed.
The outward similarities between the two cases, however,
do not spell the demise of Gardner-Denver as applied to ADA
cases. This Part argues that Gilmer notwithstanding, labor and
employment contract disputes arising under the ADA are not
substantively arbitrable. Part II.A. explains that because Gil-
mer's significance is limited to its holding that a statutory claim
may be subject to compulsory arbitration under a commercial
arbitration agreement, Gilmer has no application to collective
bargaining agreements or employment contracts. Part II.B. ar-
gues that the legislative intent and public policies behind the
ADA, as well as the policies favoring judicial resolution of pub-
lic rights disputes in general, render compulsory binding arbi-
tration inappropriate for resolving ADA disputes.
A. THE FAA: "WHERE AUTHORIZED BY LAW"?
1. For Commercial Contracts Only
In Gilmer, the Court found arbitration proper under sec-
tion 2 of the FAA because the arbitration clause in question
constituted part of a commercial contract, not a "contract of
employment." 90 The Court reached this conclusion by noting
that Gilmer's securities registration with the securities ex-
changes-a commercial contract-not his employment contract
with Interstate, contained the arbitration clause.91 Subsequent
circuit court decisions involving the same securities registration
espouse this distinction between commercial and employment
agreements, even though the cases involve Title VII, not the
ADEA.92 Gilmer's primary significance thus lies not in the
substantive arbitrability of ADEA claims but in the arbi-
trability, under the FAA, of employment discrimination claims
89. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
90. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. Because Gilmer did not raise the issue,
the Court declined to interpret the meaning of "contracts of employment"
under § 1 of the FAA. Id-
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 78-
84 and accompanying text.
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arising under commercial agreement.9 3
The Gilmer decision was not necessarily inconsistent with
Gardner-Denver,94 because it involved a commercial contract.
Its narrow holding, however, must not extend to employment
discrimination disputes arising under labor and employment
contracts. The inequalities in bargaining power not present be-
tween Gilmer and Interstate95 certainly exist in the case of col-
lective bargaining agreements and employment contracts. This
strongly suggests that compulsory arbitration is unsuited to
resolving employment disputes arising under those types of
contracts.
Collective bargaining agreements involve inherent conflicts
between group goals and individual rights that arbitration can-
not successfully resolve. As the Court recognized in Gardner-
Denver, the collective bargaining process is a majoritarian pro-
cess that cannot adequately promote the interests of minority
groups.96 That collective bargaining agreements do result from
labor-management negotiation and are accordingly "representa-
tive" in some sense9 7 does not aid the worker wishing to en-
force a statutorily protected right against discrimination. 98
93. All of the cases discussed supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text in-
volved the same securities registration as in Gilmer.
94. Contra Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989) (arguing that the substan-
tive non-arbitrability of Title VII disputes precludes enforcement of an exclu-
sive and compulsory arbitration clause regardless of its origin), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1045 (1990); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d
1304 (8th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858 (1989). Arguably, these
cases correctly note that "contracts of employment" is a broad term subsuming
all statute-based employment discrimination claims, not merely traditional
employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements. Despite this, be-
cause Gilmer concludes that an employment arbitration provision that forms
only part of a larger commercial contract with someone other than the em-
ployer is subject to the FAA, and because 'Gilmer limits its holding to that
type of contract, see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text, Gilmer does
not, in practical effect, threaten employment discrimination suits as much it at
first appears.
95. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
96. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51; accord, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745-46 (1981) (union and individual interests are not
necessarily compatible); see also Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 52, at 4-5
(opinion poll showing that management and labor attorneys perceive the inter-
est in enforcing rights under Title VII differently).
97. See supra text accompanying note 51.
98. Dilution of individual rights may occur even though unions owe a duty
of fair representation to their employees. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1,
at 177-80 & nn.107-17. According to Elkouri & Elkouri, because arbitration
remedies devised by the union "'may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable
1462 [Vol. 77:1443
ARBITRATION UNDER THE ADA
Arbitration as part of a majoritarian collective bargaining
agreement cannot substitute for the judicial resolution of con-
flicts with regard to protecting statutory individual rights.99
Even Gilmer recognized the inadequacy of the majoritarian
process, as it expressly distinguished Gardner-Denver as a col-
lective bargaining case.1° °
Even more unsatisfactory than collective bargaining agree-
ments for protecting the individual from discrimination, how-
ever, are individual employment contracts-non-negotiated
instruments that force the employee to accept all or none of
their terms.' 0 ' Such contracts additionally involve the problem
of unequal bargaining power. 02 The public interest in provid-
ing judicial enforcement of ADA and other statutory employ-
ment discrimination claims 0 3 is as compelling for individual
employment contracts as for collective bargaining agreements.
The Gardner-Denver Court stressed that private pursuit of Ti-
tle VII claims remains essential to its judicial enforcement. 0 4
Because Title VII provides "minimum substantive guarantees
to individual workers," the fact that a Title VII dispute arises
from an individual employment agreement instead of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is unimportant. 0 5
for the individual grievant,'" a grievant may seek judicial enforcement of con-
tractual rights if the union has wrongly or arbitrarily refused to enforce those
rights. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967)).
99. The ADA, like other employment discrimination statutes such as Title
VII and the ADEA, is premised on the notion that certain protected groups of
workers-the "discrete, insular minority" of disabled workers in the case of
the ADA--are underrepresented and thus merit a higher level of protection
than common legislative and other decision-making processes can afford them.
See Gould, supra note 52, at 339 (noting that the antidiscrimination laws were
promulgated in a response to unsatisfactory majoritarian rule); text accompa-
nying note 51.
100. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657.
101. See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989); FAA
Hearings, supra note 29, at 9 (statement of Sen. Walsh).
102. But see Stewart, supra note 71, at 1432 n.148 (criticizing attempts to
characterize employment agreements containing arbitration clauses as adhe-
sion contracts and asserting that courts may review the validity of a given arbi-
tration agreement without determining the substantive appropriateness of
arbitration).
103. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
104. 415 U.S. at 45.
105. Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (reasoning that the peculiarly individual interest
in Title VII permits an individual employee to "enter into a voluntary settle-
ment expressly conditioned on a waiver of petitioner's cause of action under
Title VII").
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In contrast, the Gilmer Court's characterization of the con-
tract as not a "contract of employment" but a commercial
agreement was crucial to its holding that the FAA was applica-
ble.10 6 On its own, of course, this determination cannot legiti-
mize the inclusion of employment arbitration clauses in
commercial arbitration contracts. If an employer could avoid
judicial resolution of employment discrimination disputes sim-
ply by incorporating an arbitration clause into a commercial
contract to which it and the employee were parties, then com-
mercial contracts would provide a convenient ruse for the
shrewd employer. 10 7 The contract in Gilmer, however, bound
the employee and a third party-the securities exchange. 0
Thus, although the securities exchanges may have unfairly in-
cluded an adhesion clause in the securities registration, 10 9 the
commercial agreement did not involve the same problems of
unequal bargaining power between the employer and the em-
ployee that plague collective bargaining agreements and em-
ployment contracts.
2. The Breadth of the Section 1 Exception
To hold employment disputes arising under collective bar-
gaining contracts and employment contracts exempt from com-
pulsory arbitration under the FAA because of inequalities in
bargaining power and inadequate representation, while limiting
this holding to employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements for transportation industry workers under the "in-
terstate commerce" language of section 1 seems absurd." 0 Yet,
the Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers l line of cases demands precisely this
result. 12
Tenney Engineering and its progeny rely on the principle
of ejusdem generis s3 to limit the "interstate commerce" excep-
106. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., III S. Ct. 1647, 1651 n.2
(1991).
107. See id. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1651 n.2.
109. See id, at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the employer re-
quired the employee to enter into a commercial agreement over which the em-
ployee had no influence).
110. See Cox, supra note 35, at 599 (remarking that "interstate commerce"
should not mean two different things within the same statute).
111. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc).
112. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
113. "Ejusdem generis" is defined as meaning-
Of the same kind, class or nature. In the construction of laws, wills
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tion to workers directly involved in the transportation indus-
tries." 4 The reasoning behind Tenney Engineering, however,
is wrong. 51 The FAA specifically exempts contracts of em-
ployment for workers in "interstate commerce" because Con-
gress can regulate only interstate commerce pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers,"16 not because it intended to exempt
only transportation workers and not because exempting only
transportation workers makes any sense.117 Further, the "in-
terstate commerce" exception deserves broad interpretation to
remain consistent with the definition of "interstate commerce"
in the employment discrimination statutes of recent decades.
The Tenney Engineering court reasoned that the language
in section 1 mentioning "seamen" and "railroad workers" re-
stricts "workers engaged in ... interstate commerce" to work-
ers employed in the transportation industries. 8  Legislative
history, however, only demonstrates that Congress added the
"seamen" language in response to the Seamen's Union argu-
ment that admiralty law controlled their labor disputes," 9 and
that it further added the "railroad workers" language to avoid
conflict with the Railway Labor Act. 20 Nothing suggests that
these specific concessions to organized labor impose a transpor-
tation industry limitation on the "workers engaged in... inter-
state commerce" language. In contrast, the legislative history
distinctly warns that "[ilt is not intended that this shall be an
and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where gen-
eral words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 279 (5th ed. 1983).
114. 207 F.2d at 452-53.
115. See Cox, supra note 35, at 598-99 (arguing that the courts should make
up their minds and accept one definition of "interstate commerce" for the sake
of consistency).
116. That is, Congress may not regulate anything but interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause; this power, however, is quite extensive. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
117. See ir(fra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
118. Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 452-53 (stating that "[t]he draftsmen had in
mind the two groups of transportation workers as to which special arbitration
legislation existed and they rounded out the exclusionary clause by excluding
all other similar classes of workers").
119. See id- at 455-59 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting); see also ABA REPORT,
supra note 29, at 287 (expressing Seamen's Union concern over effect of FAA
on admiralty jurisdiction).
120. Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 452-53.
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act referring to labor disputes, at all."'12 1 Congress had ample
opportunity to clarify this exception during the FAA's codifica-
tion in 1947 if it truly felt that the exception should apply only
to transportation industries. 122 Congress has never, however,
altered the terms of the exception. 123 Thus, reading a transpor-
tation industry limitation into section 1 of the FAA is nonsensi-
cal because arbitration does not peculiarly disadvantage
transportation industry workers in ways in which it does not
disadvantage other employees. If transportation workers faced
unique disadvantages through arbitration, Congress would have
mentioned the special problems of transportation workers in
text or legislative history, rather than discussing in a general
sense the inapplicability of the FAA to labor and employment
disputes.124
More importantly, the integral role of the Commerce
Clause 125 in creating the comprehensive statutory scheme of
antidiscrimination laws logically places all employees of em-
ployers covered by statutes such as the ADA under the section
1 exception, because employees by definition must be involved
somehow in interstate commerce. 126 Congress explicitly states
that it enacted the ADA pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power.127 Accordingly, as the Sixth Circuit observed in Willis
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,128 the employer subject to an an-
tidiscrimination law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause
is engaged in "interstate commerce"-ff not, Congress would
121. FAA Hearings, supra note 29, at 9.
122. Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 458-59 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
123. Compare Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 with 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (identical language in both versions of § 1).
124. See FAA Hearings, supra note 29, at 9 (statements of Sen. Walsh and
Mr. Piatt explaining that the FAA does not apply to labor and employment
disputes).
125. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
126. For example, it is now clear that a hotel may engage in interstate com-
merce because it is located off an interstate freeway or, even if it is more local
in nature, because it operates a restaurant and orders most of its food from
companies in other states. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 297
(1964) (about half of food supplies of restaurant had moved in interstate com-
merce, even though the restaurant engaged in primarily intrastate business);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (motel at-
tracted patrons from other states); see also supra note 42 (discussing cases).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (Supp. III 1991). Congress also invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for enacting the ADA. Id.
128. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991). Because the definitions of an "employer"
for Title VII and ADA purposes are virtually identical, Willis's reasoning ap-
plies to the ADA. See supra note 13.
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lack constitutional authority to regulate its business.' 9 Em-
ployees of this employer, therefore, are engaged in "interstate
commerce" regardless of whether their job duties are directly
entwined with interstate activity.1 30
Furthermore, the legislative history does not support the
view that the "interstate commerce" exception applies only to
transportation industry workers. Congress's broad regulatory
powers under the Commerce Clause render the argument even
more dubious. Instead, a proper interpretation of section 1 ex-
empts from compulsory arbitration all collective bargaining
agreements and employment contracts for workers subject to
the ADA or other antidiscrimination laws promulgated pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause, reserving the FAA for commer-
cial arbitration.131
B. ARBITRATION: "WHERE APPROPRIATE?"
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gilmer'3 2 and Mitsubishi
133 exhibit a growing preference for arbitration under the
FAA.13 Even in the noncommercial context,135 the Court has
129. Id at 311.
130. Id
131. Under § 2 of the FAA, of course, the commercial contract must evi-
dence a "transaction involving commerce," to which the broad definition of
"commerce" would presumably apply. See supra notes 37-44 and accompany-
ing text.
132. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
133. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
134. Both Gilmer and Mitsubishi invoke the "'liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements.'" Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657 (quoting Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 625). Gilmer is somewhat troublesome because it is really an em-
ployment dispute in commercial clothing. See supra notes 106-09 accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, as an ADEA case since extended in like circumstances
to Title VII, see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text, its reasoning may
easily be transferred to true employment contract cases, emasculating Gard-
ner-Denver and leaving the resolution of statutory claims to arbitrators. Com-
mentators vigorously debated the wisdom of the Gilmer decision even while
the case was still pending in the court of appeals. See Donohue & Siegelman,
supra note 18; Dowd, supra note 27; Lobenthal, supra note 10; Stewart, supra
note 71; Note, supra note 71. Because this Note argues that Gilmer premised
its analysis on the commercial nature of the agreement, rather than focusing
on the nature of the statute involved, it will not address the correctness of Gil-
mer's substantive arbitrability analysis under Mitsubishi, even though this au-
thor believes that the analysis is flawed.
135. Most attempts to compel arbitration of collective bargaining agree-
ments arise under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the court inter-
preted § 301 to authorize federal and state courts to compel specific perform-
ance of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Under the
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long expressed a preference for arbitration when appropri-
ate,1 36 because of its ability to resolve contractual disputes on
an individualized basis in an efficient, inexpensive, and private
manner.137 Many of its advantages over the judicial process,
however, render it inappropriate as a binding method of resolv-
ing discrimination claims.138 Arbitral decisions have no obliga-
tory precedential value, even for subsequent arbitral
proceedings. 39 The arbitrator may only publish them with the
consent of the parties. Arbitral decisions thus form no coher-
ent body of law and provide few guidelines for future behav-
ior.140 Further, although arbitrators may consider statutory
law in arriving at awards,' 4 1 courts may not reverse their deci-
sions for errors in interpreting or applying law.
142
narrow Tenney Engineering interpretation of the FAA, a party to an employ-
ment contract may seek arbitration under the FAA, but the party more likely
will seek arbitration pursuant to the contract terms themselves. See supra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
136. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
137. See, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1655 (characterizing commercial arbitra-
tion as an informal method of out-of-court dispute resolution); ELKoURI &
ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 7-9 (labor arbitrators need not rely on previous pub-
lished arbitration decisions, so each award is specific to the facts of the case);
FAIRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 526-30 (outlining benefits of ar-
bitration, including cost and propensity for more conciliatory settlements);
Dowd, supra note 27, at 444 (arbitration has cost advantages over litigation and
ideally "results in less tension and hostility" between parties).
138. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974) (observing
that arbitration is suitable for resolving some disputes because of arbitrators'
special competence in the "law of the shop" and the informal atmosphere of
arbitral proceedings, but that these factors render arbitration "comparatively
inferior" to the judicial process with regard to Title VII); see also FAIR-
WEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 525-26 (parties should assume that
agreements in employment contracts to arbitrate "all disputes" do not include
federally protected statutory claims).
139. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 421 ("prior labor arbitration
awards are not binding in exactly the same sense that authoritative legal deci-
sions are").
140. Id. at 417 (noting that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
confidentiality of arbitral award except at incentive of parties).
141. See id. at 100 & n.1 (4th ed. Supp. 1989) (citing various cases and labor
arbitration decisions in which the arbitrator relied upon external law); see also
FAiRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 525 & n.58 (arbitral decision of
statutory claim may be accorded "great weight" in some courts, even if it lacks
preclusive effect); SACKS & KURLANTZNICK, sup'ra note 55, at 121-22 (acknowl-
edging that arbitrators may properly apply external law if the parties entered
into a contract "in awareness" of an external source of law, or if the parties
are advised before the external law is applied).
142. See FAIRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 522 (employment
arbitration precludes further litigation absent contractual defenses such as
fraud, duress or fundamental unfairness); see also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
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These characteristics conflict with the public and individ-
ual purposes underlying Title I of the ADA, just as they con-
flict with Title VII, whose remedies the ADA incorporates. 143
First, although Congress devoted relatively little discussion to
the arbitration provision in the ADA,1 " it repeatedly under-
scored the purely supplemental nature of arbitration, emphasiz-
ing that it did not support final and binding arbitration for
ADA disputes.145
Other members of Congress endorsed this interpretation of
the arbitration provision, observing that public policy requires
that arbitration remain only supplementary to judicial resolu-
tion. These members stressed the responsibility of the federal
government for enforcing the ADA's statutory protections on
behalf of disabled individuals. 46 Congress, by enunciating the
role of the federal government and traditional judicial remedies
in fighting discrimination, expressed a fundamental mistrust of
note 1, at 100 & n.2 (citing Postal Workers v. United States Postal Serv., 789
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. III 1991).
144. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 449.
145. The House Committee on the Judiciary, which introduced the arbitra-
tion provision, cautioned that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to ar-
bitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking re-
lief under the enforcement provisions of this Act." Id. at 76, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 499-500. Congress conspicuously avoided including commer-
cial arbitration agreements in its discussion, supporting the conclusion that
Gilmer, while correct as applied to the commercial contract in that case and
while distinguishable from Gardner-Denver, must not extend to collective bar-
gaining agreements and employment contracts under the ADA.
146. The Committee on Education and Labor concluded that "the unfortu-
nate truth is that individuals with disabilities are a discrete, specific minority
who have been insulated in many respects from the general public." H.R.
REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 2, at 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 322 (emphasis added). Further, the Judiciary Committee noted that "[t]he
ADA provides enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individ-
uals with disabilities and ensures that the federal government will play a cen-
tral role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with
disabilities." H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 2, at 23, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 446 (emphasis added).
Congress observed that notions of public policy have begun to recognize
that "many of the problems faced by disabled people are not inevitable, but
instead are the result of discriminatory policies based on unfounded, outmoded
stereotypes and perceptions, and deeply imbedded prejudices toward people
with disabilities." id at 25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 448; see also
supra note 2 (describing the plight of the disabled American worker); supra
text accompanying note 11 (noting Congress's acknowledgement that employ-
ment discrimination against disabled persons is prevalent).
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compulsory binding arbitration as a satisfactory method of
resolving ADA disputes, despite its willingness to permit ADA
claimants to take advantage of arbitration as a supplemental
"overlapping remedy. '147
Second, the Gardner-Denver Court recognized that Con-
gress "has long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or
overlapping remedies against discrimination.1 48  Both the
ADA and Title VII permit and encourage plaintiffs to take ad-
vantage of all available fora without exhibiting a preference for
federal over state courts. 149 In fact, these statutes require that
a plaintiff first exhaust parallel state procedures and EEOC
procedures before proceeding to suit in federal court.150 More-
over, the ADA's remedies clearly show that even the prior
EEOC and state agency proceedings authorized by Title VII151
do not preclude the claimant from pursuing a federal suit. To
hold that arbitration under a contract forecloses an ADA claim-
ant from taking advantage of statutory procedures eviscerates
the congressionally proclaimed role of the federal court system
in protecting the rights of the disabled.152
Finally, and most importantly, the ADA, like Title VII, is a
civil rights law that implicates the public's interest in its judi-
cial enforcement.153 The ADA concerns, in the words of Gard-
ner-Denver, "an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities"'-54-a right long denied to disabled individuals
147. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (arbitra-
tion may serve as a "parallel" or "overlapping" supplement to judicial
resolution).
148. 1& The Court offered not only Title VII but also the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866, 1871 and 1964 as evidence that the civil rights laws attempt to provide
as many fora as possible for the resolution of discrimination claims. Id at 47
& n.7.
149. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47-48 & nn.7-9; see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(a)-(d) (setting forth the alternatives of state and local enforcement
and EEOC enforcement); § 2000e-5(f) (providing for civil actions following
EEOC determinations); § 2000e-5(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (enforcement by
the EEOC). The Judiciary Committee, in enacting the ADA, recognized that
the availability of state fora is essential to the full enforcement of ADA rights
by refusing to preempt relevant state laws. See supra note 11.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
151. This is only true, of course, if the EEOC issues a "right-to-sue" notice
under § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988). The EEOC will not issue such a notice if it finds
the claim meritorious and assumes the claim.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991) (stating that one of the
ADA's purposes is "that the Federal government plays a central role in en-
forcing standards ... on behalf of individuals with disabilities").
153. See supra note 10 for sources describing the concept of "public rights."
154. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); see also
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who "continually encounter various forms of [employment] dis-
crimination."' 5 5 The means for enforcing this public right must
not rest with the arbitral process because the ADA involves
questions of law, not of contract interpretation. The arbitral
process is insufficient because arbitrators specialize in "the law
of the shop, not the law of the land,"'1 56 because they do apply
external law in reaching decisions,157 and because their misap-
plication of the law is generally not reversible error. 58 Conse-
quently, unsatisfactory arbitral decisions that result from the
erroneous application or interpretation of the ADA (and are es-
sentially immune from appellate review) 159 are more prone to
occur.
1 6 0
Further, even when arbitrators correctly apply the ADA to
employment disputes, their decisions may not appreciably deter
future discriminatory conduct nor provide precedents for ap-
propriate employer behavior.161 Without the benefit of numer-
ous published judicial opinions, the ADA objectives of
eliminating discrimination through deterrence of discrimina-
tory conduct 62 and of promoting the "clear, strong, consistent"
standards for preventing discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals16 3 will be seriously compromised, not only because
many individuals who have been wronged will not bring suit,1'
Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 52, at 8 (revealing that the dignitary value
of Title VII litigation is of significant importance to plaintiffs).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. III 1991).
156. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)).
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
159. ELxoURI & ELKouRi, supra note 1, at 28-32 (warning that courts are
loath to overturn arbitral decisions except on the basis of fraud, bias or fla-
grant disregard for the terms of the contract on the part of the arbitrator);
FAIRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 522 (judicial review of employ-
ment arbitration awards limited to contractual challenges).
160. See Lobenthal, supra note 10, at 75-77. Lobenthal argues that when
the general public has an interest in vindicating certain statutory rights, such
as Title VII, the risk that arbitrators will commit unreviewable errors in ap-
plying the law results "in significant social costs." Id. at 77 & n.42 (citing to
and discussing Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Legal Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973)).
161. See Lobenthal, supra note 10, at 77; see also Donohue & Siegelman,
supra note 18, at 1023-28 (an empirical discussion of the deterrent effects of
antidiscrimination laws); Note, supra note 71, at 575 (acknowledging that al-
lowing the employer to require arbitration of certain statutory disputes argua-
bly creates a greater potential for employer abuse).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. III 1991).
163. See supra text accompanying note 10.
164. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 18, at 1023 (noting that "[t]he
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but also because those who do wish to pursue their grievances
will lack a consistent body of law on which to base their
complaints.1 65
Taken together, these concerns that arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement or employment contract cannot
adequately promote the individual or public interests protected
by the ADA require that the disabled individual's right to pur-
sue her statutory remedies remain intact. All collective bar-
gaining agreements and employment contracts within the
ADA's coverage are in "interstate commerce" for purposes of
the FAA and are thus not subject to compulsory arbitration
under that act's strong policies favoring arbitration. Addition-
ally, the clear congressional intent to ensure that arbitration re-
main supplementary to statutory remedies-to say nothing of
the reasons why arbitration fails to promote public rights-
demonstrates why compulsory binding arbitration is inappro-
priate even apart from the FAA.
III. ARBITRAL AWARDS AS VOLUNTARY
SETTLEMENTS
Although Congress did not intend binding arbitration to be
an exclusive remedy for ADA disputes, the language of the
statute clearly shows an intention not to completely preclude
arbitration of ADA disputes. Indeed, section 513 of the ADA
specifically encourages the use of arbitration and other means
of alternative dispute resolution. 66 Unless final and binding ar-
bitration is possible in some circumstances, section 513 loses its
practical significance. The preceding analysis does not preclude
voluntary arbitration in every instance. The Court in Gardner-
Denver remarked that a Title VII plaintiff could waive statu-
tory remedies as part of a voluntary settlement, provided that
efficacy of Title VII and many other federal antidiscrimination laws depends
primarily on the willingness and ability of workers to bring private suits" but
that "if discrimination victims never sue, then employers have no economic in-
centive to comply"). This problem becomes even more serious if many of the
individuals who would ordinarily bring suit against their employers are com-
pelled to arbitrate them instead, because the body of case law interpreting the
ADA and acting as a deterrent will be further depleted.
165. Cf. Dowd, supra note 27, at 445 (observing that the arbitration of an-
tidiscrimination law claims (in particular, the ADEA) "may frustrate the de-
velopment of the exact social policies the statute was designed to implement").
But cf Stewart, supra note 71, at 1434 (arguing that the arbitration of ADEA
claims does not frustrate the statutory purposes at all because the decision to
arbitrate is "voluntary").
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. III 1991).
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consent to the waiver was "voluntary and knowing."' 67 The
language of section 513, tempered by its legislative history and
the policies behind the ADA, demonstrates the propriety of this
"voluntary settlement" approach to interpreting the arbitration
provision.
After an ADA claim arises, parties who wish to arbitrate
should first attempt to agree on final and binding arbitration
expressly conditioned on waiver of judicial resolution.168 Arbi-
tration pursuant to express waiver binds both parties, who then
cannot challenge the validity of the arbitral award based on the
arbitrator's incorrect interpretation of the ADA.1 69 If the par-
ties cannot agree to waive judicial resolution, however, they
may pursue nonbinding arbitration with the possibility of
reaching a satisfactory settlement while preserving the right to
file an ADA claim.
Following this latter approach, the ADA claimant should
simultaneously file a complaint with the EEOC or parallel state
agency.' 70 This requires that the decision to arbitrate take
place within the statutorily prescribed time period for filing an
ADA claim with the EEOC.171 The EEOC investigation will
then toll pending the outcome of the arbitration;172 filing is
necessary, however, to avoid later dismissal for failure to com-
ply with the statutory procedures.
The parties may proceed with arbitration with the under-
standing that the arbitral decision is not yet binding. This
practice establishes that when arbitration is complete, the ADA
claimant may seek relief through federal or state processes
167. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52 & n.15.
168. The Supreme Court hinted in Gardner-Denver that it would find
postdispute agreements to arbitrate binding as long as they expressly condi-
tioned arbitration upon waiver of Title VII rights. Id.; see also FAiRWEATHER's
ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 526 ("arbitration agreements entered into after
the operative facts have occurred have a better chance of being enforced by
the courts"). As explained earlier, this approach is unnecessary in the context
of a commercial agreement because arbitration is authorized by the FAA. See
supra notes 94, 106-09 and accompanying text.
169. See generally FAiRWEATHER'S ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 388-465
(discussing methods of vacating, enforcing, or correcting an arbitral award).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(e) (1988) for the proper filing procedure.
171. The employee must file with the EEOC or parallel state agency pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(e)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
172. Because the ADA favors conciliatory measures over litigation, if possi-
ble, the EEOC would stay its investigation to avoid unnecessary involvement
even if it finds the claim meritorious or to avoid investigation altogether in the
event of a satisfactory claim that it probably would not have found meritori-
ous. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)-(2) (1988).
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under the ADA if with the arbitral award proves unsatisfac-
tory.173 Further, this practice ensures that the agreement to ar-
bitrate is voluntary. A party who cannot be bound to an
arbitral decision until after the award has little reason to con-
sent to initial arbitration except voluntarily.174
In this regard, the arbitration resembles a settlement nego-
tiation and comports with Gardner-Denver's recognition of
waiver by voluntary settlement. 7 5 If the arbitration produces a
result satisfactory to both parties, if the employee is fully aware
of her rights under the ADA, and if she is willing to forsake
them, the parties have reached a settlement and the employee
can then agree in writing to waive her right to pursue statutory
remedies under the ADA.'7 6 By consenting to the arbitral
award, the employee indicates sufficient satisfaction with the
arbitral award and expresses her willingness to forgo judicial
resolution. Thus, if the employee is later dissatisfied with the
award-perhaps as a consequence of subsequent events in the
workplace, or after mere reflection-and sues to overturn the
arbitral award, the court may enforce the award on general
contract principles, based on the postarbitral agreement.
This proposed method of satisfying the impetus behind en-
couraging nonjudicial dispute resolution while preserving the
employee's substantive rights under the ADA is not without its
flaws. It is certainly skewed in favor of protecting the em-
ployee.177 Moreover, it is somewhat time consuming because in
the event that a dispute results litigation, the arbitral process
173. The EEOC or parallel state investigation has only tolled during the ar-
bitral period and should begin again following the arbitral decision.
174. This in turn satisfies the ADA's requirement that arbitration be
"purely voluntary." HOUSE RECORD, supra note 22, at H2421-22.
175. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
176. To avoid later confusion over the informed nature or voluntariness of
the employee's decision to sign a postarbitral agreement, the agreement should
advise the employee to see an attorney, should include an explicit statement of
the ADA rights and a waiver of these rights, and should provide a reasonable
time period for revocation, such as the limits set forth in the waiver provision
of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. III 1991).
177. Critics of the "voluntary settlement" approach may argue that pos-
tarbitral agreements unduly favor employees because dissatisfied employees
will never sign postarbitral agreements not to litigate unless they realize there
is no hope for victory in court. This may be true in some instances, but not in
all such cases. Moreover, postarbitral agreements are no less legitimate
merely because they favor employee satisfaction over employer victory. Be-
cause ADA rights are of paramount importance to the individual and to soci-
ety, a "voluntary settlement" approach that gives the individual two chances at
dispute resolution is consistent with the purposes underlying the ADA. See
supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
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amounts to little more than a lengthy delay. These difficulties
do not, however, strip the "voluntary settlement" method of
confirming an arbitration award of its value.
First, although the "voluntary settlement" approach usu-
ally favors the employee, it does not always do so.1 78 Certainly,
a dissatisfied employee with a real grievance will not sign the
postarbitral agreement not to litigate. Despite this, not all
ADA grievances that proceed to unsuccessful arbitration will
result in subsequent litigation just because the employee was
dissatisfied. For example, should the factfinding process of ar-
bitration convince the employee that perhaps her claim could
not withstand judicial analysis, she will abandon her ADA
claim. In such a case, arbitration relieves the employer, the
EEOC, and the court system of the costly and time-consuming
burden of investigating and litigating an unmeritorious ADA
claim. Further, should the employer leave arbitration dissatis-
fied, nothing in the "voluntary settlement" approach requires it
to sign the postarbitral agreement.1 79 The employer remains
equally free to refuse to sign the agreement and to free the em-
ployee to pursue her statutory remedies, if the employer be-
lieves that it will fare better as a defendant in court than across
the arbitration table.
Finally, the "voluntary settlement" approach does not re-
quire that the parties reach the same result as they would in
court; thus, the size of an adequate award will often be smaller
than the value of a court judgment. This is true because em-
ployees will likely accept a lower award than they could per-
haps obtain in court to avoid hostile and costly litigation.
Similarly, employees, unless they appear pro se before the
courts, must take into account attorney's fees and court costs in
the event of a loss. Finally, because litigation is time-consum-
ing, the parties may agree to sacrifice some of the possible ben-
efits of the ADA remedies for the relative efficiency of
arbitration.
This "voluntary settlement" approach, though skewed in
178. Employers may also benefit from arbitration even if they have to pay,
because the costs are lower, because the forum is less hostile, and because the
stigma of losing at arbitration is lower, from a dignitary standpoint, than that
of being judged a discriminator in court.
179. As a practical matter, the employee probably decides whether to be
bound or not to the arbitral agreement since she is the party with the statu-
tory rights under the ADA. Even so, the settlement approach does not act as a
"one-way ratchet"-a dissatisfied employer who loses more than she thinks
she will lose in litigation may refuse to sign.
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the employee's favor, ensures that pursuing final and binding
arbitration is "appropriate" for purposes of the ADA. In addi-
tion to providing employers with a fair mechanism for enforc-
ing voluntary arbitration awards, it gives ADA plaintiffs the
opportunity to submit disputes to arbitration without the risk
of losing the right to statutory relief. Further, it recognizes
that arbitration, used properly, may advance the goals of the
ADA by providing more efficient, less antagonistic, and less
costly relief to plaintiffs who wish to take advantage of alterna-
tive dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION
The ADA manifests a congressional intent to favor speed-
ier and less expensive dispute resolution through arbitration
and other alternative means of dispute resolution when the
parties voluntarily and knowingly consent. Courts should be
wary, however, of attaching too much significance to this en-
couraging language. The exception for "contracts of employ-
ment" under the FAA demonstrates that compulsory
arbitration is not "authorized by law." In addition, the policies
behind the ADA require that the only "appropriate" use of
binding arbitration is the "voluntary settlement" that permits
parties to agree to be bound only after arbitration. By balanc-
ing the employee's judicially enforceable right to be free from
discrimination with the court's and employer's interests in pro-
moting less expensive and time-consuming means of dispute
resolution, the "voluntary settlement" approach to arbitration
takes advantage of the best of both alternatives by providing ar-
bitration as an attractive and convenient form of relief while
preserving the vital public policies underlying the ADA.
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